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It is, for me, a great honour and also a matter of some poignancy to deliver the
2008 Street Lecture, not the least because last month I retired from my Chair
at the Manchester University Law School, a post which I most happily held for
21 years. Harry Street was, of course, one of my most illustrious predecessors.
Although he was most renowned for his work as a mainstream public lawyer,
my encounters with him were in relation to other areas. His book Principles
of the Law of Damages,1 an insufficiently remembered tour-de-force, was an
inspiration for me. Here he displayed not only his great analytical skills but
also an ability to probe deeply into the policy dimension of legal rules; and
this with the aid of an accountancy and actuarial input.2 Indeed, he helped
to foster interdisciplinary work when, within the British legal academy, it was
in its infancy. My first meeting with him was when he was a member of the
Social Science Research Council Committee for Social Sciences and the Law.
Regulation in 1979
The theme I have chosen for my lecture is inevitably interdisciplinary. On
March 13, 1979 I delivered my inaugural lecture as Professor of Law at the
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.3 It was intended to display my recently
acquired interest in the economic analysis of law, but it was principally
concerned to criticise the serious neglect at that time of regulatory law, both
in the British law schools and in legal policy-making circles. I thought it might
be interesting and instructive to revisit the issue some 30 years later to identify
and evaluate the developments which have since taken place.
*This is a revised version of the 24th Street Lecture, delivered at the University of Manchester on
October 17, 2008.
1 H. Street, Principles of the Law of Damages, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1962).
2 See his trenchant criticism (Principles of the Law of Damages (1962), pp.243–245) of the decision in
Cullinane v British Rema Manufacturing Co Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 292 CA.
3 It was published as ‘‘Economics, Liberty and the Common Law’’ (1980) 15 Journal of the Society of
Public Teachers of Law (NS) 42.
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To speak about ‘‘regulation’’ obviously requires me to provide a definition
of a concept which has different meanings both for lawyers and non-lawyers.4
Without entering into niceties, I take it to refer to obligations imposed by
public law designed to induce individuals and firms to outcomes which they
would not voluntarily reach. Regulation is largely enforced by public officials
and compliance is aided by the threat or imposition of some sanction. As such,
regulation covers a vast array of state controls over industrial and commercial
activities.
Now, the criticism in my 1979 inaugural lecture was not that these areas
of law had been ignored. There was legal expertise within the individual
government departments responsible for the specific regulatory regimes and
often a consultative autonomous or semi-autonomous agency, such as the
Health and Safety Commission and the standing Royal Commission on
Environmental Protection. But there was no public body with over-arching
responsibility for addressing regulatory issues more generally.
Then, as regards academic legal work, there was plenty of legal analysis
published on specific regulatory sectors such as health and safety at work,
consumer and environmental protection, town and country planning, banking
and insurance. But these writings were predominantly technical expositions
of the law with little attempt to stand back from the details and critically
explore the regulatory objectives and the different legal instruments capable of
achieving those objectives. There were even fewer attempts to address these
issues across different regulatory sectors.
Some exceptions to this general picture are worth mentioning. In the first
half of the 20th century Ernst Freund made some path-breaking, but now
largely forgotten, attempts to generalise about regulatory law in the United
States.5 This side of the Atlantic, the nearest equivalent was a collection of essays
written by a group of scholars (including Jennings, Laski and Robson) at the
London School of Economics and published in 1935 under the unpromising
title, A Century of Municipal Progress.6 In the post-war period, the most striking
contribution was Wolfgang Friedmann’s Law in a Changing Society7 which
chronicled the rapid growth of public law incursions on private law, including
land-use planning on private property rights; state welfare provision on family
law entitlements; social insurance on tort liability; and health and safety
regulation and consumer protection on contract.
What did these books have in common? They were highly insightful in their
treatment of legal forms used for interventionist measures, but they did not
lead to any general interest among public lawyers in the topic. Why was this?
One not so trivial explanation was that the authors were in some sense external
4 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart, 2004), pp.1–3.
5 Standards of American Legislation (University of Chicago Press, 1917), Administrative Powers over
Persons and Property; a comparative survey (University of Chicago Press, 1928) and Legislative Regulation:
A Study of the Ways and Means of Written Law (Commonwealth Fund, 1932). And see O. Kraines, The
world and ideas of Ernst Freund: the search for general principles of legislation and administrative law (University
of Alabama Press, 1974).
6 Jennings, Laski and Robson (ed.), A Century of Municipal Progress (Allen & Unwin, 1935).
7 W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (University of California Press, 1959).
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to traditional Anglo-Saxon public law. Freund, although born in America,
was educated in Germany; Wolfgang Friedmann was a German e´migre´; and
the LSE collaborators were largely political scientists. As such, these authors
were less inhibited by the public law culture of common law systems. The
historical, politico-economic basis of these systems is to be located in judicially
determined principles of law enshrining freedom from state intervention and,
with it, the Diceyan focus on judicial review and controlling the powers of the
Executive.
In civil law jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, public law had a
wider ambit and state interventionist law had been more readily embraced
within legal culture. Certainly it has been easier to identify regulatory law in
these legal systems (la re´glementation8; die Regulierung9) because within public law
divergent regulatory regimes have been subsumed and studied under categories
such as le droit public de l’e´conomie10 and Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht,11 categories
of law for which there are no direct Anglo-Saxon equivalents.12
In short, in 1979, I felt entitled to argue that the type of legal instruments
used by governments for interventionist purposes, and the characteristics
which made them more or less effective in achieving desired outcomes, were
neglected topics both in the British law schools and in British policy-making
circles generally.
Regulation in 2008
Thirty years after my Newcastle inaugural lecture the situation has changed
out of all recognition. Take first government and public policy-making. We
now have a government Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform and, within it, a unit optimistically known as the Better Regulation
Executive.13 Within the last two years, there has been a Legislative and
Regulatory Reform Act,14 a Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act15
and a Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators,16 together promising some
sweeping changes to institutional arrangements across the whole regulatory
field. And there have been similar developments elsewhere. At Brussels, a
‘‘better regulation’’ strategy17 has also recently emerged, mirroring to some
extent the Whitehall initiatives. For some time, ‘‘regulatory reform’’ has had a
high profile on the agenda of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
8 C. Wiener, Recherches sur le pouvoir re´glementaire des ministres (LGDJ, 1970).
9 C. Kirchner, Regulierung durch O¨ffentliches Recht (Hoffmann-Riem/Schmidt-Aßmann, 1996).
10 P. Delvolve´, Le droit public de l’e´conomie (Dalloz, 1998).
11 R. Stober, Besonderes Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (Kohlhammer, 2007).
12 See H. Goldschmidt, English Law from a Foreign Standpoint (Pitman, 1937), pp.90–92.
13 http://www.berr.gov.uk/bre/ [Accessed February 22, 2009].
14 2006 (c.51).
15 2008 (c.13).
16 BERR, Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators—Regulators’ Compliance Code (Better Regulation
Executive, 2007).
17 European Commission, A Second Strategic Review of Better Regulation in the European Union
COM(2008)32.
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Development.18 In most industrialised countries, some form of ‘‘regulatory
impact analysis’’ is now required as part of the law-making process.19 In
Belgium it is referred to as the ‘‘Kafka Test’’.20 More generally, the level,
quality and effectiveness of regulation is now a favourite topic of political
discourse.
There has also been an astonishing transformation within the academic world
generally, and within the legal academic world in particular. The number of
publications devoted to regulation has become very large. A crude count of
the number of books held in the University of Manchester’s John Rylands
Library with the word ‘‘regulation’’ (as used in our sense) in the title published
in the 30 years before my Newcastle lecture is 10; the number published
in the 30 years after is well over 80. Research institutions and educational
programmes devoted to studying regulation now abound. When I arrived at
the Manchester Law School in 1987, there was almost nothing on the subject.
Today we now have a Professor of Regulation, a Sustainability and Regulation
Research Centre, a Regulation, Security and Justice Research Centre and five
courses on systems of regulation or regulation generally currently taught at
undergraduate and postgraduate levels.
Public policy developments 1979–2008
How and why has all this come about? There is no easy and succinct answer to
that question; rather, we need to appreciate the accumulating impact of diverse
influences and sources. I shall examine, in turn, public policy and academic
developments.
I begin with a paradox: ‘‘regulation’’ assumed a higher profile when
‘‘deregulation’’ became an important policy goal. In terms of breadth and
intensity of intervention in commercial and industrial activities, the 1970s are
generally regarded as providing the high-water mark of regulation. Public
ownership was still widespread among the energy industries, and there was an
unprecedented volume of detailed regulations attempting protection against
risks to health and safety, the environment, and financial distress. But it was also
a period of scepticism and alleged regulatory failure. Nationalised industries
were perceived to be inefficient; much protective regulation was considered
to be rigid, poorly targeted and inadequately enforced.21
Now, although what followed in the 1980s and subsequently was often called
‘‘deregulation’’,22 it is more aptly designated as a period of transformation
of regulatory forms and arrangements. Many publicly owned industries,
particularly the utilities, were privatised, but since—prior to the liberalisation
18 e.g. OECD, From Red Tape to Smart Tape (OECD, 2003).
19 C.M. Radaelli, ‘‘The Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis—Best Practice or Lesson-Drawing’’
(2004) 43 European Journal of Political Research 723.
20 See http://www.kafka.be [Accessed February 22, 2009].
21 C.R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard University
Press, 1990).
22 H.-J. Chang, ‘‘The Economics and Politics of Regulation’’ (1997) 21 Cambridge Journal of Economics
703, 711–716.
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of the relevant markets—these firms enjoyed monopoly power, it was essential
that the price and quality of their products were regulated. That raised a host
of questions since such economic regulation had hardly existed in the United
Kingdom since the 19th century; and the creation of new institutions, structures
and processes necessarily involved some consideration of the more general issue
as to what regulatory arrangements were appropriate.23 For example, a key
question was of the degree of independence from central government which
the new regulators should enjoy.
Reform of other regulatory sectors was not so dramatic, but no less important.
The problem increasingly besetting health and safety and environmental
regulation was that of information: in an age of fast changing technology,
industry (or at least some of it) was likely to know better than government
how best to control risks. That suggested that the traditional ‘‘command-
and-control’’ form of regulation was inappropriate in certain contexts
and was gradually to be replaced by forms of ‘‘co-regulation’’, industry
contributing to some degree to the formulation of standards, self-certification
and enforcement.24 Then, as part of the ‘‘new management’’ programme
introduced into the public sector, regulatory policy-making was largely
separated from regulatory administration.25
A third set of reforms moved in the opposite direction. Much financial and
professional regulation had, for cultural and historical reasons, been informal
and left to professional associations or some other private institution. InMoran’s
masterly account of the phenomenon, it is designated as ‘‘club government’’.26
In a modern world of democracy and accountability, the legitimacy of this
approach came at last seriously to be doubted. Co-regulation proved, here also,
to be a suitable compromise.
The common features of the three developments that I have been describing
are that they provoked a need to reflect on the function and forms of
regulation across different sectors; and that need was reinforced by a fourth
catalyst: the integration of markets as regards both European and global
dimensions. The problem here is immediately apparent. National regulatory
systems can constitute major obstacles to trans-boundary trade. Now there is a
variety of solutions to this problem, from doing nothing (and thus encouraging
competition between regulatory systems), through mutual recognition, to
approximation between and harmonisation of national systems.27 Choice
between these alternatives is dependent on a complex combination of factors,
but cannot properly be made without a deep understanding of the nature and
operation of regulatory processes.
23 C. Graham and T. Prosser, Privatising Public Enterprises: Constitutions, the State and Regulation in
Comparative Perspective (Clarendon Press, 1991).
24 N. Gunningham et al., Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (OUP, 1999).
25 J. Stewart and K. Walsh, ‘‘Change in the Management of Public Services’’ (2007) 70 Public
Administration 499.
26 M. Moran, The British Regulatory State: high modernism and hyper revolution (OUP, 2003), pp.33–34.
27 D. Esty and D. Geradin (eds), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives
(OUP, 2001).
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Regulatory scholarship 1979–2008
We need not here be concerned with the fascinating question as to the extent
to which the policy developments I have described were influenced by, or
rather themselves stimulated, academic studies. Suffice it to acknowledge that
interactions have taken place in both directions; and I now need to identify
and characterise the intellectual contributions.
In the late 1970s, at the time of my Newcastle lecture, legal scholarship had
moved, if somewhat cautiously, into the interdisciplinary arena. Collaboration
between criminal justice lawyers and sociologists in the study of criminology
had existed for some time. Traditionally the focus had been on street crime,
but an interest subsequently developed into what was known as ‘‘white collar
crime’’ to address the intriguing question how the treatment of regulatory
offences committed by employers, traders, professionals and others compared
with that of mainstream crime.28
That inquiry linked to the emerging field of ‘‘socio-legal studies’’. The driver
of the latter was the hypothesis that law in action was very different from law in
the books, thus requiring empirical investigation. One of the first topics to be
studied with this methodology was the behaviour and functioning of regulatory
agencies, particularly as regards law enforcement.29 Some of this research had
criminological roots; another source was the perception within the ranks of
public lawyers that administrative law was about much more than the judicial
review of executive decision-making.30 An important finding emerging from
this type of research was that formal legal powers and sanctions were relatively
underused, with the implication that command-and-control regulation was
different from other types of coercive law, notably the mainstream criminal
law.
At the time when socio-legal studies were beginning to make headway,
younger legal scholars were also becoming familiar with social theories of the
state. Public lawyers, in their efforts to break free from the Diceyan tradition
and definition of administrative law, were, in particular, attracted by corporatist
conceptions of government.31 Regulation was in reality not a set of commands
by the legislature legitimised and constrained by conventional instruments of
administrative law; rather it was seen to involve a set of processes, formal and
informal, managed by collaboration between bureaucrats and major interest
groups, such as industrial associations and trade unions. The problem created
by such arrangements was not only that of legitimation under the rule of law;
there was also the risk that the regulatory goals would be subverted by the
28 W.G. Carson, ‘‘White Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation’’ (1970) 10 Brit.
J. Criminol. 383.
29 Carson, ‘‘White Collar Crime’’ (1970) 10 Brit. J. Criminol. 383; G. Richardson et al., Policing
Pollution: A Study of Regulation and Enforcement (OUP, 1982); K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement:
regulation and the social definition of pollution (OUP, 1984).
30 e.g. T.C. Daintith, ‘‘Regulation by Contract: the New Prerogative’’ (1979) 32 C.L.P. 31.
31 T. Prosser, ‘‘Towards a Critical Public Law’’ (1982) 9 J. Law & Soc. 1.
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large corporate interests.32 The solution was perceived to lie in reinvigorated
processes of participation and accountability.
In the 1980s, corporatism was seen to be over-simple and, as an influence
on regulatory legal scholarship, became overshadowed by systems theory. I
refer to the latter with some hesitation and diffidence because of my limited
knowledge of it. From this theoretical perspective, regulation is viewed as a
closed sub-system, with its own set of actors, procedures, culture and, above
all, language, distinct from other sub-systems, such as the law.33 Within the
system, the relationship and degree of interdependence between the actors are
complex, so that control internally, and even more so externally, is intrinsically
problematic. The result will often be that regulation generates unintended
outcomes, because the externally formulated goals are not easily internalised
into the systems and then implemented there.
Undoubtedly this theory provides a very persuasive explanation for the
phenomenon of ‘‘regulatory failure’’ to which I have already referred. It is less
obvious how it can be applied normatively, to prescribe how the problems can
be overcome, thus contributing to the ‘‘better regulation’’ debate. Julia Black,
a leading exponent of the approach, nevertheless suggests that, to counter the
identified difficulties,
‘‘. . . regulation should be a process of coordinating, steering, influencing
and balancing interaction between actors/systems, and of creating new
patterns of interaction which enable social actors/systems to organise
themselves, using such techniques as proceduralisation, collibration,
feedback loops, redundancy, and above all countering variety with
variety’’.34
I confess to being less than comfortable with the level of abstraction as well as
complexity adopted in this guidance, but I do recognise that it can be related to
the phenomena of decentralisation of regulatory institutions and co-regulation
which I have identified as important developments, what contributors to this
literature characterise as ‘‘reflexive’’ or ‘‘responsive’’ regulation.35
Associated with this literature, but at the same time, more approachable, and
undoubtedly more influential for policy-making purposes, has been the work
of the leading Australian scholar John Braithwaite, and his associates.36 They
see regulatory processes as involving continuing interaction, even a game,
between the various actors (regulators, regulatees, and sometimes also public
interest groups), decisions being made by reference to the perceived costs
and benefits of alternative strategies. Co-operation between the players will
32 See, in relation to occupational health and safety, M. Beck and C. Woolfson, ‘‘The regulation of
health and safety in Britain: from old Labour to new Labour’’ (2003) 31 Industrial Relations Journal 35.
33 J. Black, ‘‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1.
34 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation’’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, 9.
35 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP, 1999), pp.65–69.
36 See especially I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate
(Oxford University, 1992). His most recent book, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works; Ideas for Making
it Work Better (Edward Elgar, 2008), brings together different strands of his rich contributions to
regulatory theory.
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typically generate mutual benefits but more formal, legal responses become
necessary if and when the co-operative approach fails to secure the desired
outcome. So, for example, an agency, seeking to enforce a given regime,
will deal with contraventions by responses of increasing severity, from a base
of benign advice to an apex of prosecution and punishment, until it secures
compliance—the famous ‘‘enforcement pyramid’’.37
The reference to ‘‘costs and benefits’’ provides the link to the third
interdisciplinary approach to regulation, that of law and economics. However,
in this country, the economic perspective on regulation was slow to develop.
With a few exceptions, British economists became interested in regulation
only with and after the revolution in the governance of the utilities in the
1980s.38 Understandably what attracted them to the new arrangements were
the problems of controlling prices and the relationship between prices and the
levels of competition operating in the relevant markets. For lawyers, a valuable
product of ‘‘new regulatory economics’’, as it has become known, has been
a deeper understanding of how the institutional arrangements influence the
behaviour both of the regulated industries and of the regulators themselves,
having regard, in particular, to the way in which the arrangements deal with
the informational advantages possessed by the industries.39 Unless curbed, the
latter clearly constitute an obstacle to good public interest decision-making.
It is a matter of regret that British economists working in this field have, on
the whole, brought their expertise to bear on a relatively limited number of
regulatory regimes. The situation has been very different in the United States,40
no doubt because the sub-discipline of law-and-economics has flourished there
to an extent not paralleled in other countries. Indeed, law-and-economics has
viewed regulation from two quite different perspectives, and with two quite
different sets of normative implications. The first, associated with the so-called
‘‘public choice’’ branch of economics, is concerned to explain the existence
and form of regulation by reference to the market for legislation. A cynical
conviction that most regulation confers benefits on specific groups within
society and is therefore in the private, rather than the public, interest leads to
a theoretical framework in which politicians supply laws to groups of citizens,
in accordance with the demand for them, the price for the transaction being
some form of political support.41 From determinations of which groups can
offer the highest ‘‘price’’ and can co-ordinate their lobbying efforts at least
cost, predictions can be made as to what regulatory benefits will be secured by
this means.
This analysis may have greater application to, and plausibility for, the
American legislative arrangements than for our own; it also underestimates the
37 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992), p.35.
38 From the huge literature, I would single out as being the most influential, J. Vickers and G.
Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis (MIT Press, 1988).
39 J.-J. Laffont, ‘‘The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After’’ (1994) 67 Econometrica 507.
40 See, e.g. the textbook by W.K. Viscusi, J.M. Vernon and J.E.D. Harrington, Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust (MIT Press, 2000).
41 Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (2004), Ch.3.
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degree to which laws may result from ideology or altruism.42 Nevertheless even
in a European context it is clear that some regulation, apparently in the public
interest, in fact rather serves specific private interests, and may be assumed to
have been the result of trading of the kind described.43 Normatively, the theory
also serves to focus attention on legislative and regulatory processes and the
need to ensure, through requirements of transparency and participation, that
they are not subverted to manipulation by private interests. In consequence
this form of economic analysis can be linked to the traditional public law
approaches to regulation. But, rather like systems theory, public choice can
make only a limited contribution to the design of the substantive law of
regulation.
In this respect, the second economic perspective on regulation has much
more to offer and this is because the methodology used directly addresses
the nature and form of the interventionist instrument. Starting from the
conventional micro-economic postulate that intervention is justified only
where the unregulated market fails to achieve outcomes which are socially
desirable, in relation to any particular area of regulation the task is to identify the
market failure and then to select the method of intervention which predictably
will correct that failure at least cost.44 So, for example, in relation to hazardous
activities, for the choice between controls requiring prior approval, such as
licences, and those subject only to product and services standards ex post
market entry a key determinant is a comparison of the social costs arising from
the imperfect enforcement of ex post standards with the heavier administrative
costs of a licensing system.45 Regulatory impact analysis, which has assumed an
important role in policy-making, does, or should, confront policy choices in
this way. A concern to minimise information costs in relation to rule-making
can help to explain and justify the shift away from ‘‘command and control’’ to
co-regulation46; and economic models of deterrence, with their analysis of the
costs and benefits of engaging in unlawful behaviour and of providing sanctions
and other disincentives, can demonstrate why, for most types of regulatory
contraventions, administrative sanctions are preferable to criminal sanctions.47
Key issues for regulatory policy-makers
In the preceding section, I attempted to show how the interdisciplinary
perspectives which I have outlined have provided important insights and
42 D. Farber and P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (University of Chicago
Press, 1991), pp.26–33.
43 A. Ogus, ‘‘Legislation, the Courts and the Demand for Compensation’’ in R.C.O. Matthews
(ed.), Economics and Democracy (Macmillan, 1985), pp.151–167.
44 D. Dewees (ed.), The Regulation of Quality: Products, Services, Workplaces and the Environment
(Butterworths, 1983).
45 S. Shavell, ‘‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’’ (1993) 36 Journal of Law and Economics
255.
46 A. Ogus, ‘‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’’ (1995) 15 O.J.L.S. 97.
47 A. Ogus, ‘‘Better Regulation—Better Enforcement’’ in S. Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation (Hart,
2007), pp.107–122.
[2009] P.L. April  2009 Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited and Contributors
Regulation Revisited 341
to some degree also have made meaningful contributions to the critical
evaluation of significant developments to regulation which have occurred in
the last 30 years or so. These include the legitimation of systems, particularly
those traditionally subject to self-regulation, through enhanced accountability,
which been an important focus of social theories. The same can be said of
the phenomena of decentralisation, participation and co-regulation. Economic
approaches can be related to choices between, and the better targeting of,
interventionist instruments. I now turn, if too briefly, to the question of the
key issues which regulatory policy-makers must now, and in the near future,
address; and how regulatory scholarship might be able to assist in the task. I
will, I trust, be forgiven if I focus on those areas of regulatory scholarship with
which I am most familiar.48
It seems to me to that the issue which is likely to dominate debate regarding
regulation in the immediate future is the legitimate scope and degree of
protection against risk. Within the media two images of regulation currently
compete. On the one hand, there is a perception of regulatory failure in
relation to entrepreneurial excesses and financial distress and a call for more
rigorous controls, the same arguments being invoked to confront accidents
(major and minor), climate change, corruption, terrorism and a host of other
risks. On the other hand, industry is bemoaning the fact that the government
aspirations in recent years to reduce the regulatory burden have had little effect
and that the problem of ‘‘red tape’’ is as prevalent as ever.
I must first attempt to clarify this latter assertion, for there is an ambiguity
in the language used. The expression ‘‘red tape’’ implies the excessive
administrative burden of dealing with regulatory obligations, typically in
the provision of information. Interpreted as such, the criticism is often well-
founded and there is a general consensus that more could be done to simplify
the burden by such measures as making regulatory information requirements
less cumbersome, facilitating transactions between regulatory agencies and
firms, and stocking and sharing information once received.49
However, when the representatives of industry use the ‘‘red tape’’ expression
they usually are referring to the wider concept of the general costs of regulatory
compliance, including those of taking precautionary measures. The assertion
must then be interpreted as being that those general costs are too often
disproportionate to the benefits generated by the required precautionary
measures. My own intuition suggests that, in relation to some risks, our
expectations of what regulatory systems can do are too high and that some of
the protection which has emerged is ill-targeted or comes at too great a cost.
To concretise this, I shall use a simple and very local example. Although it may
appear to be trivial, I hope to show that it raises very fundamental issues which
regulatory scholars, as well as policy-makers, must address.
48 And therefore not banking and financial regulation, notwithstanding the current importance of
these sectors.
49 OECD, From Red Tape to Smart Tape (2003), p.16.
[2009] P.L. April  2009 Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited and Contributors
342 Public Law
Sensible risk regulation: a local example
Some 400 yards from where the Street lecture is given, at the junction between
Oxford Road and Booth Street, Manchester, there is a set of traffic lights.
There is nothing exceptional about them and how they operate is typical for
the centre of Manchester and, indeed, as far as I know most other British cities.
However because I passed through them frequently, both as a pedestrian and
as car driver, and they are close to where I regularly pondered problems of
designing regulation, I have observed how they operate and their impact on
behaviour.
The pattern is as follows: first, the green light allowing vehicles to travel
east and west; second, the same for those travelling north and south; and third,
traffic is stopped and a green signal enables pedestrians to cross in all directions.
These arrangements are authorised by the Zebra, Pelican and Puffin Pedestrian
Crossings Regulations 1997,50 and individuals—pedestrians as well as vehicle
drivers—failing to comply with signals, in principle commit an offence under
the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.51 In fact, casual observation reveals that
the large majority of pedestrians do not wait for the signals in their favour but
cross whenever it is safe to do so. In assessing whether this form of regulation
protecting pedestrians is justified, we can impressionistically attempt to appraise
the costs and benefits.
It would, of course, have been possible to have omitted the third step in
the cycle which protects pedestrians, leaving it to them to determine when it
is safe to cross the road, taking account particularly of the signals controlling
vehicles on the relevant road, but this was not done. How was the relevant
decision made? How should it have been made? A set of guidelines issued
by the Department of Transport in 199552 provides the probable answer to
the first question. The local highways authority is expected to undertake a
site survey, making estimates, most importantly, of the levels of traffic and
pedestrian flow, the difficulty for the latter in crossing (having regard to any
special characteristics of the local pedestrian population), the accident record
at the location, and the predictable vehicle delay resulting from the pedestrian
crossing being installed. There is also some encouragement to take into account
representations made by residents and others from the locality.
If adhered to, these guidelines would seem to suggest rational and transparent
regulatory decision-making, ensuring that the benefits of interventionist
measures will predictably exceed their costs. I remain unconvinced of this.
Take first benefits. The only clear direct benefit of the pedestrian protection
is to those (the minority) who take advantage of it and is to be assessed by
reference to the increased safety and freedom of anxiety they enjoy, compared
with the situation in which no such protection is available. The guidelines
50 SI 1997/2400.
51 s.25(5).
52 Local Transport Note 1/95: The Assessment of Pedestrian Crossings, available at
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roads/tpm/ltnotes/ssessmentofpedestriancro4033.pdf [Accessed February 22,
2009].
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admittedly require some assessment of the difficulty to pedestrians of crossing
and require some estimate of the numbers of children, visually impaired persons
and those with mobility difficulties likely to use the crossing. But predictions of
how the accident rate might be reduced are not encouraged and consideration
is not given to the proportion of pedestrians who will in any event disregard
the signals.
Let us move next to costs. An estimate must be made of likely vehicle
delays and my experience of the Oxford Road-Brook Street junction suggests
that these are not trivial, particularly given the congestion to which the traffic
controls give rise at peak periods. However, at this point in the analysis, one’s
faith in a cost-benefit framework for decision-making is undermined by the
comment in the guidelines that ‘‘[t]he effect of delays on vehicles must be
considered but should not normally over-rule the provision of a crossing where
there is a clear difficulty for pedestrians’’.53
Another serious defect is the failure to take into account some important
indirect costs. I am thinking here not only of the exasperation felt by motorists
as they watch the majority of pedestrians blatantly disregard the signals,
but more importantly also of the more aggressive behaviour to which that
exasperation seems to give rise. I get the impression (enhanced by awareness of
my own reactions when at the steering wheel) that, to minimise further delays,
drivers subjected to the conditions I have described tend to rush through
junctions when the lights against them are amber or have just turned red; and
in general drive more aggressively. If this is right, it might not be too fanciful
to hypothesise that measures taken to increase pedestrian safety might in fact
reduce pedestrian safety.
It would be wrong for me to reach hard conclusions on whether the
arrangements at our local junction are justified because I do not have available
the requisite data. Intuitively I suspect that the costs outweigh the benefits,
unless the crossing is used by a significant number of pedestrians, such as
children and elderly or disabled persons, who require special protection. What
concerns me more is the conviction that the framework devised for regulatory
decision-making appears to be biased towards protective regulation. I would
add to this that representations made by interested parties to the authorities may
intensify this effect, because (I assume) local pedestrians and their representatives
are more likely to communicate their views and to have those views heeded
than motorists and their representatives.
Lessons for regulatory policy-makers
What helpful lessons can we learn from my little example for the benefit
of regulatory policy-making? Let me start from a legal, perhaps socio-legal,
perspective. As we have seen, the risk-creating behaviour in this area is the
subject of legal obligations. Pedestrians, as well as vehicle-drivers, failing to
obey the signals at the crossings can in theory be prosecuted for an offence
53 Local Transport Note 1/95: The Assessment of Pedestrian Crossings, para.4.1.1.
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under the Road Traffic Regulation Act. I can imagine that there have been
many convictions of non-compliant motorists, but there is little evidence
of the law being enforced against pedestrians. Indeed, I have never seen a
non-compliant adult pedestrian being even reprimanded by the police.54 Why
is this? To argue that the harm resulting from non-compliance by pedestrians
is not sufficiently important to justify the use of limited law-enforcement
resources begs the question as to why the harm was considered sufficiently
serious to justify the imposition of legal obligations in the first place. And there
is the additional point, that regulatory requirements should not be imposed if
it is known that a large majority will not obey them and that contraventions
will invariably be tolerated by the relevant enforcement authority. Such an
approach tends to bring the law in general, and the specific regulatory system
in particular, into disrepute.
The socio-legal perspective reveals, then, that an understanding of
behavioural responses to regulatory obligations is crucial for good regulatory
design. The prohibition of smoking in public places may have been effective
because the ban appears to have been internalised into social behaviour without
a major enforcement effort, but the same cannot be said of legislation penalising
the littering of our streets, suggesting that other regulatory policies might be
preferable in this area.
An economic perspective enables us to draw out two important themes
from our example. First, and most, obviously, the benefit-cost framework is
indispensable for proportionate regulatory decision-making; and that should
involve proper consideration of indirect costs as well as direct costs, and a
realistic appraisal of benefits. We can recognise that some, perhaps all, of the
variables may be difficult to quantify, but that does not undermine the value of
the exercise. Even if consequences are described rather than quantified, placing
them within the analytical framework should enable decision-makers to make
better impressionistic decisions.
This is particularly important in a world where the media attention to
accidents and their readiness retrospectively to blame public agencies for failure
in relation to them creates a climate of public opinion demanding the total
elimination of risks. An economic appraisal of the steps necessary to achieve this
shows that the marginal costs of the additional precautions necessary to reduce
still further tiny risks increase massively.55 Moreover, the resources necessary
for such precautions are then not available for other purposes generating social
welfare, including the reduction of other, perhaps more serious risks.56
Secondly, economic theory can help us in identifying the least-costly method
of controlling particular hazards. Nobel Prize Laureate Ronald Coase has taught
us that it is simplistic to assume that all, or even most, accidents are the result of
the failings of ‘‘risk-creators’’.57 The behaviour of risk-victims is also relevant,
54 In contrast to Germany where I have myself been reprimanded for ignoring a red pedestrian
light—perhaps an indication of how seriously the Germans take Die Regulierung.
55 Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (2000), Ch.19.
56 C.R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2005),
Ch.6.
57 R. Coase ‘‘The Problem of Social Cost’’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
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particularly if they can avoid the harm by precautions which are much less
costly than those that the risk-creator must take. I fear that this lesson has
not been successfully assimilated by our regulatory decision-makers and the
pedestrian crossing case provides an excellent illustration: by their behaviour in
disregarding signals, the great majority of pedestrians show that they are capable
of avoiding the risk at, to them, a trivially low cost. In their over-zealous efforts
at protection, regulators too often fail to recognise the simple precautionary
measures that can be taken by, and expected of, potential victims. Regulatory
intervention in relation to such risks can then take the form of information
regulation, requiring risk-creators to take adequate measures to communicate
information about the risk to potential victims, rather than themselves reducing
the risk.58
To this argument I would expect to hear the objection that in practice
ordinary people have problems in assimilating information about many of
the risks and even if these are overcome, we cannot expect them always
to respond rationally to the information. Both assertions are justified and it
becomes necessary to discriminate between those risks in relation to which
precautionary measures by victims should and should not be expected. That is
not an easy task but one which should be undertaken and to which regulatory
scholarship can, I believe, make a major contribution.
The contribution can be both theoretical and empirical. At a theoretical
level, scholars and policy-makers need to grapple with paternalism.59 This
concept has been neglected as a subject for study, perhaps because in an age of
political correctness we are uneasy about directly articulating the notion that in
a given set of circumstances the state (or politicians, or bureaucrats, or experts)
know better than ordinary citizens what is good for them. Uncomfortable as
we may be with it, the notion of paternalism surely provides an important
explanation of large tracts of protective regulation and normatively it must
be important to identify situations and circumstances where the approach is
justified.
Overriding an individual’s preferences on the ground that the consequences
are not good for that individual requires caution since it strikes at the very
heart of liberty. A limited justification can be derived from the possibility that
individuals recognise that they will be subject to temptations which they will
find difficult to resist, but which will impose on them long-term costs. In
such circumstances, the utility of individuals is enhanced if they agree ex ante
to submit to an external control depriving them of the temptation.60 This
reasoning can then be extended to situations where individuals can recognise
ex ante that they may behave irrationally or make errors of judgement. The
paternalist intervention may then be treated as legitimate if it involves meeting
what it is assumed would have been the preferences of individuals if they had
responded rationally to full information about risks.
58 W.K. Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (Clarendon Press, 1998), Ch.3.
59 A. Ogus, ‘‘Regulatory Paternalism: When Is It Justified?’’ in K.J. Hopt, E. Wymeersch, H. Kanda
and H. Baum (eds), Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Market in Europe, Japan and
the United States (OUP, 2005), pp.303–320.
60 P. Kleinig, Paternalism (Manchester University Press, 1983), pp.55–67.
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The empirical contribution can be to identify situations not only where
information is lacking or is not in practice assimilated, but also where
individuals typically respond irrationally to risks. Social psychology and
behavioural economics have in recent years produced much evidence on
the latter, by for example pointing to circumstances in which individuals are
overly optimistic on the unlikelihood of a risk materialising.61 An important
task for regulatory scholarship is to draw out of the findings implications for
the extent to which we cannot expect potential victims themselves to take
precautions against risks.
Conclusions
To address what I have identified as key issues for the future of risk regulation,
I therefore draw out two principal generalisations. First, the need to appraise
regulatory responses to risk by reference to costs and benefits remains of
paramount importance. Secondly, to accomplish that appraisal task successfully
we need to explore at greater depth the question of what can reasonably be
expected of risk victims by way of precautions. The last requirement can,
indeed, be related to a more general concern: ‘‘better regulation’’ has to be
based on a better understanding of behavioural responses to regulation.
Such a goal has several dimensions. I have concentrated on risk-victims, and
the need to differentiate between circumstances where effective precautions
can and cannot be taken by them. An analogous approach can be taken
to risk-creators. How do they respond to the different regulatory forms
and procedures? The move away from ‘‘command-and-control’’ to more
decentralised and co-regulatory systems implies that most risk-creators are
well-informed and capable of judging how best to control risk. But are they?
Risk-creators are not a homogenous group: some are large, well-endowed
with information and the appropriate technology and well-managed; others
are small, ill-informed, struggling to make a profit and therefore unwilling to
waste resources in acquiring and processing information necessary for effective
risk-management. The latter need to be told what to do. In an important
study, two of my Manchester colleagues have recently suggested that in the
area of waste disposal traditional ‘‘command-and-control’’ regulation is, for
these reasons, the preferable instrument for dealing with small firms.62
These reflections enable me to finish this lecture with a paradox. I have shown
that in the 30 or so years since my Newcastle lecture, regulatory scholarship
and regulatory policy-making have made enormous progress in addressing the
key issues which transcend the boundaries between regulatory sectors. To
some extent that development now needs to be reversed. The generalisations
that we have reached on the effectiveness of regulatory principles and processes
should now be made sensitive to differences in behavioural response as regards
different actors in different regulatory environments.
61 C.R. Sunstein (ed.), Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
62 D.Williamson, G. Lynch-Wood. and J. Ramsay, ‘‘Drivers of environmental behaviour in
manufacturing SMEs and the implications for CSR’’ (2006) 67 Journal of Business Ethics 317.
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